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ABSTRACT
Gender diversity issues are receiving great attention worldwide. Empirical evidence 
suggests that stronger women representation on boards is positively related to fi nan-
cial performance. Across Europe, initiatives for greater women representation on 
boards are undertaken. They vary from one country to another and include propos-
als in national codes, voluntary initiatives, demands for disclosure of nomination 
policies and legal quotas for women on company boards. Recent data show that 
women account for an average of 18.6% of the members of boards in the EU 28 
member states. Results of the empirical study we provide show that women represen-
tation on Croatian companies’ boards is just below European average and that the 
progress in ten years period has been fairly poor. Still, in Croatia doesn’t exist strong 
social support nor legislative that would improve gender balance in supervisory and 
management boards. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the emerging issues in corporate governance on the global level is 
related to gender inequality that can be observed on boards worldwide. De-
mands for stronger women representation on boards are motivated by equal 
opportunity and inclusion activism on one hand, but also by the arguments that 
wider board diversity will contribute to more effective and effi cient boards via 
providing different perspectives, experience, knowledge and skills.
Reasons for stronger women representation are, among others, economic in 
nature. Empirical evidence suggests that stronger women representation on 
boards is positively associated to fi nancial performance.1 
Gender diversity is in accordance with consumer base of most of the compa-
nies. It is related to less unethical behavior, better reputation and perception of 
the company as being more socially responsible.2 Moreover, gender diversity 
is associated to higher level of innovativeness and proportion of women in 
governing bodies is predictor of reduced level of confl icts and stronger focus 
on board performance and quality.3
1  Boards with stronger women representation have 10% higher ROE, 48% higher EBIT and 
1.7 times higher stock price growth in comparison to Stoxx Europe 600 for 89 European-listed 
companies. McKinsey & Company (2007) Women Matter: A Corporate Performance Driver 
cited in Catalyst (2013) Why Diversity Matters, Catalyst Information Centre, available at http://
www.catalyst.org/knowledge/why-diversity-matters (12.02.2015.)  
2  A panel at a World Economic Forum in Davos put the question: “Would the world be in 
this fi nancial mess if it had been Lehman Sisters?” Many participants believed that the answer 
was no, referring to the fi ndings suggesting women were more prudent and less ego driven then 
men in fi nancial management contexts. See Rhode, D. L. and Packel, A. K. (2014) Diversity on 
corporate boards: How much difference does difference make?, Delaware Journal of Corporate 
Law, Vol. 39, p. 394. On the other hand, Dobbin and Jung in their 2007 study suggest that gen-
der diversity may be infl uencing corporate governance not by shaping effi cacy or monitoring 
capabilities of boards themselves, but by activating bias on the part of institutional investors 
who now control 80% of the shares of America’s leading companies. They show that boards 
are attentive to the demands of institutional investors for greater board diversity. Second, they 
show that investor decision making is infl uenced by gender bias, and that the typical investor 
will reduce holdings in fi rms that appoint female directors. Finally, they show that account-
ability apprehension will mediate this process, such that visible blockholding institutional fund 
managers and public pension fund managers (who as a group pressed for board diversity) will 
be less likely to act on gender bias. See Dobbin, F. and Jung, J. (2011) Corporate board gender 
diversity and stock performance: The competence gap or institutional investor bias?, North 
Carolina Law Review, Vol. 89, pp. 809-838
3  Other forms of diversity based on race, board member background, LGBT identity and 
nationality are also found to be positively associated to fi nancial performance. See Catalyst 
(2013) Why Diversity Matters, Catalyst Information Centre, available at http://www.catalyst.
org/knowledge/why-diversity-matters (12.02.2015.)  
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2. A CALL FOR GENDER EQUALITY ON CORPORATE BOARDS
In United States, close to three-quarters of members of corporate boards of 
the largest American companies are white men. According to the most recent 
data, women hold only 16.9% of the seats on Fortune 500 boards. Women oc-
cupy 14.8% of Fortune 501-1000 board seats and only 11.9% of board seats in 
Rusell 3000 companies.4
Initiatives for greater women participation in corporate governance structures 
vary from one country to another and include different measures from propos-
als in national codes, voluntary initiatives, demands for disclosure of nomina-
tion policies to legal quotas for women on company boards. Across Europe, 
quotas for female membership on corporate boards have been generating in-
terest, and in a few countries, these quotas have been passed. Norway was 
the fi rst country to introduce gender quotas in 2005 requiring at least 40% of 
public limited company board members to be women (for boards having more 
than 9 members). After these targets became mandatory, companies had to 
comply by 2008. For companies not following these instructions, monetary 
sanctions and even shutting the business down were applicable.5
Likewise, in Spain most of the improvement in women’s representation on 
board occurred between 2005 and 2006 when a recommendation concerning 
gender representation at board level was introduced in a new code of gover-
nance and when Equality Act that established a gender quota was enacted in 
2007 requiring a minimum of 40% representation for both genders in listed 
companies (employing more than 250 employees).6 Quotas have been intro-
duced in France and Belgium in 2011.
4  Rhode, D. L. and Packel, A. K. (2014) Diversity on corporate boards: How much differ-
ence does difference make?, Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 39, p. 379. Rhode and 
Packel notice that in United States support for diversity has grown in principle, but progress 
has lagged in practice (sixteen countries now require quotas to increase women’s representa-
tion on boards, and many more have voluntary quotas in corporate governance codes).
5  Even though all publicly listed fi rms now in operation comply with the quotas for board 
membership, the number of female CEOs in Norway remains fairly stable. This result has 
come about because many of the most qualifi ed women, known as the “Golden Skirts” now sit 
on several boards, leading to a smaller than predicted increase in the overall number of women 
on corporate boards nationwide. See in Sweigart, A. (2012) Women on Board for Change: The 
Norway Model of Boardroom Quotas As a Tool For Progress in the United States and Canada, 
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, Volume 32, Issue 4, available at http://
scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb/vol32/iss4/6 (30.04.2015) 
6  Fagan, C. and Gonzalez Menendez, M. C. (2012) Conclusion, pp. 245-258 in Fagan, C., 
Gonzalez Menendez, M. C. and Gomez Anson, S. Women on Corporate Boards and in Top 
Management: European Trends and Policy, Palgrave MacMillan, UK 
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In November 2012, European Commission adopted a Proposal of Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving gender balance 
among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and 
related measures.7 European Commission appealed to all listed companies 
having less than 40% of the under-represented sex non-executive directors to 
assure representation of at least 40% aiming at gender equality. By 2020, gen-
der equality (50% representation) should be reached by active implementation 
of selection and appointment procedures for non-executive directors (one-tier 
system) and for supervisory board members (two-tier system).
In November 2013, European Parliament has voted with an overwhelming ma-
jority to back the European Commission’s proposed law to improve the gender 
balance in Europe’s company boardrooms.  Even though consensus has been 
reached on the necessity of improving gender balance, still there is a high level 
of disagreement on how this should be achieved. 8
Recent data provided by European Commission show that women account for 
an average of 18.6% of the members of boards in EU 28 member states (that is 
an increase of 0.8% in comparison to 2013). The smallest proportion of women 
on boards is in the Mediterranean countries such as Malta (2.7%), Portugal 
(8.7%), Spain (16.2%) and that proportion is enlarging as we geographically 
move toward northern European countries. In Latvia, for example, represen-
tation of women accounts for 31.4%, in Sweden 27.1%, in Finland 28.6%. In 
France, even it has basic characteristics of Mediterranean country, women rep-
resentation accounts for 30.4%.9 The largest proportion of women on boards is 
in Norway, two fi fths, which is in accordance with law.  
7  Proposal of Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving gender 
balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related 
measures, Bruxelles, European Commission. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gen-
der-equality/fi les/womenonboards/directive_quotas_en.pdf (02.02.2015)
8  Many national delegations strongly support the proposed Directive while other del-
egations remain opposed. Those delegations have stressed that Directive fails to respect 
the principle of subsidiarity and principle of proportionality as well. As to prevent further 
negotiation stagnation, the opposed delegations have proposed a package of measures. 
Mandatory measures would be implemented in disclosure segment only (making room for 
“comply-or-explain” rule). Also, longer period for adjustment has been proposed and com-
panies should have a right to choose between objectives of at least 40% representation of 
the under-represented sex on non-executive positions or at least 33% representation of the 
under-represented sex on all of the director positions (both executive and non-executive). 
See in ecoDa (2014) EU Updates-April 2014 (Board’s diversity/Policy), Brussels, European 
Confederation of Directors’ Associations
9  European Commission (2014) Gender Balance on Corporate Boards: Europe is Crack-
ing the Glass Ceiling. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/fi les/womenon-
boards/wob-factsheet_2014_en.pdf (07.02.2015)
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There is an evident trend of growth in numbers; for the last fi ve years, the 
number of women on boards has increased for about 70%.10 Recent evidence 
shows that proportion of women on supervisory boards in Croatian compa-
nies, unfortunately, doesn’t follow these trends. Women on boards in Croatia 
account for 15.3%.11
Results show that more than half of the respondents holding highest deci-
sion-making positions in European companies are facing problems regarding 
nomination of women members. Only 13% of male respondents support gen-
der quotas implementation while 41% of female respondents support gender 
quotas.12 The percentage of new coming female board members and CEOs is 
increasing but still shows very slow progress.13
10  Heidrick & Struggles (2014) Towards Dynamic Governance, 2014 European Corporate 
Governance Report. Available at http://heidrick.com/ff/media/Publications%20and%20Re-
ports/European-Corporate-Governance-Report-2014-Towards-Dynamic-Governance.pdf 
(03.02.2015)
11  Research that has been conducted in Croatia show that in 2011 the proportion of wom-
en on boards was just above European average (18.76%). See in Tipurić, D. and Mešin, M. 
(2011) Promjene vrhovnog menadžmenta u hrvatskim poduzećima in Tipurić, D. (Ed.) Prom-
jene vrhovnog menadžmenta i korporativno upravljanje, Sinergija, Zagreb, pp. 71-99.  Most 
recent data provided by European Commission suggest that Croatia is bellow EU 28 member 
states average regarding proportion of women on boards. See European Commission (2014) 
Gender Balance on Corporate Boards: Europe is Cracking the Glass Ceiling. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/fi les/womenonboards/wob-factsheet_2014_en.pdf 
(07.02.2015)
12  Heidrick & Struggles (2014) op. cit., p. 7
13  On the global level, 3.6% of all incoming CEOs are women (decrease of 1.5% in com-
parison to 2012). Still, this is signifi cantly higher than 2.1% representing average for period 
2004-2008. For the last ten years the number of incoming female CEOs is increasing. From 
2004, the number of incoming female CEOs is greater for about 65% than the number of 
outgoing female CEOs. See Favaro, K., Karlsson, P. O. and Neilson, G. L. (2014) The 2013 
Chief Executive Study-CEO Turnover in 2013. Available at http://www.strategy-business.com/
article/00254?pg=all#ceo_turnover (07.02.2015)
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Graph 1: Proportion of women on boards14
Not surprisingly, companies in Norway have the biggest proportion of women 
on boards; on average, one third of all board members are female. The rest of 
the Scandinavian countries are above European average when it comes to repre-
sentation of women on boards. Croatia is still signifi cantly better than European 
average (proportion of female members on supervisory boards) and way ahead 
of the culturally similar, Mediterranean countries like Italy and Portugal. 
In sum, across Europe there is a little but visible step forward in increasing 
representation of women on boards mainly through legislation and regulation. 
In the United States, resistance to quotas builds on longstanding concerns 
about any departure from meritocratic principles.15 Comply-or-explain should 
be more appropriate approach according to advocates of gender diversity.
Besides issues of representation, another inequality persists: female board 
members are still underpaid for the same job as their male counterparts. Wom-
en on top management positions still receive on average 30%-45% less than 
their counterparts (in terms of total compensation) and the greatest proportion 
14  Deloitte (2011) Women in the boardroom: A global perspective. Available at http://
www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-Tanzania/Local%20Assets/Documents/Deloitte%20Article_
Women%20in%20the%20boardroom.pdf (10. 04.2012)
15   According to Rhode and Packel, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg typifi es this view. When 
asked in 2011 why his fi ve-member board had no women, he responded: “I’m going to fi nd people 
who are helpful, and I don’t particularly care what gender they are… I’m not fi lling the board 
with check boxes.” Rhode, D. L. and Packel, A. K. (2014) Diversity on corporate boards: How 
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of their total compensation package accounts for base salary while the propor-
tion of payouts from long-term incentive plans is signifi cantly smaller.16
In Europe, there is still evident gender pay gap. Male non-executive directors 
received 9% higher total compensation then female non-executive directors in 
2013 (the only exception are female board presidents). Notable progress is evi-
dent in Italy where the gap has been reduced to 4% (in 2013 this gap accounted 
for 22%) and Netherlands where pay gap has been reduced to 2% (from 8%). 
On the other hand, gender pay gap is expanding in Germany (22%), Austria 
(18%) while the pay median in Norway is the same for both genders. 17
3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM CROATIA
In 2014, a team of researchers, members of the South East Europe Corporate 
Governance Academic Network18 (SEECGAN) has developed an innovative 
instrument in order to capture the quality of corporate governance in listed 
companies in region. Since each country has its context specifi cities, the inten-
tion was to develop a unique measurement instrument that will deliver compa-
rable results. SEECGAN index covers seven relevant areas of corporate gov-
ernance: (1) structure and governance of boards, (2) shareholder’s rights, (3) 
transparency and disclosure of information, (4) audit and internal control, (5) 
compensation/remuneration, (6) corporate risk management and (7) corporate 
social responsibility.19 From June to October 2014, Croatian team collected 32 
valid questioners (out of 162) from companies listed at Zagreb Stock Exchange 
regulated market. Almost half of the companies from the sample (15) employ 
more than 1000 employees and 11 companies employ between 250 and 1000 
employees. Only 6 companies from the sample are small and medium sized 
(employ up to 250 employees). On average, companies from the sample em-
ploy 1967 employees. In 2013, 22 companies from the sample have reported 
operating profi t (69.7%) while 10 companies reported operating loss (31.3%).
16  Part of these observed differences can be explained by the size of female managed compa-
nies. See Mohan, J. and Ruggiero, J. (2007) Infl uence of fi rm performance and gender on CEO 
compensation, Applied Economics, 39 (7-9), pp. 1107-1113; Albanesi, S. and Olivetti, C. (2006) 
Gender and Dynamic Agency: Theory and Evidence on the Compensation of Female Top Exec-
utives. Available at http://people.bu.edu/olivetti/papers/execomp_draft1.pdf (25.02.2015)
17  HayGroup (2014) Non-executive directors in Europe 2014: Painting a picture of pay prac-
tices, structures and diversity of leading European companies. Available at http://haygroup.
com/ff/media/fi les/resources/documents/hg%20ned%20report%202014.ashx (07.02.2014)
18  Complete list of researchers from Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, 
Montenegro and Macedonia is available at http://www.ciru.hr/index.php/seecgan/ (30.04.2015) 
19  See complete report Tipurić, D. et al. (2015) Korporativno upravljanje u Hrvatskoj: Ocjena kvalitete 
korporativnog upravljanja hrvatskih dioničkih društava SEECGAN metodologijom, CIRU, Zagreb
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Shares of 15 companies from the sample were included in the offi cial share 
index of the Zagreb Stock Exchange-Crobex (on 31st December 2014). 
According to ownership structure data provided by Central Depository & 
Clearing Company Inc. (on 31st December 2014), for total of 34 shares issued 
by 32 issuers from the sample (2 issuers have ordinary and preference shares 
listed), average share of the largest shareholder accounts for 40.46% (or 41.85% 
calculated only by the ordinary shares). High level of ownership concentration 
is one of the key features of closed system of corporate governance such as on 
in the Republic of Croatia. 
Under Croatian corporate law, public companies may operate either under 
one-tier or two-tier system. Out of 32 companies, only one company has 
one-tier board.
For companies operating under two-tier system, the average number of the su-
pervisory board member is 5.61 while average number of management board 
members is 2.74. These results are similar to ones from the 2013 study, where 
the average number of the supervisory board members in Croatian listed com-
panies was 5.62.20 In the company operating under one-tier system, board has 
10 male members, out of whom 2 are non-executive directors (president of the 
board and vice president).
Graph 2: Average number of board members in Croatian public companies21
20  Mešin, M. (2013) Povezanost djelotvornosti nadzornog odbora s poslovnom uspješnošću 
poduzeća, doktorska disertacija, Ekonomski fakultet Zagreb, Zagreb, p. 143
21  Survey results. See complete report Tipurić, D. et al. (2015) Korporativno upravljanje u 
Hrvatskoj: Ocjena kvalitete korporativnog upravljanja hrvatskih dioničkih društava SEEC-
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Results of the study clearly indicate that 68.5% of the companies from the 
sample neglect minimum requirements of gender equality (authors of the 
SEECGAN index have reached consensus that under-represented sex should 
be represented by at least 30%).
On average, there is only one female member on supervisory boards (x-=0,967) 
while there is a majority of companies (61.29%) without female supervisory 
board members. On 19 management boards there are no female members (x-
=0,452). The proportion of female members on management boards is 16.74% 
while the proportion of female members on supervisory boards is 17.26%.22
Graph 3: Proportion of female supervisory and management board members in 
Croatian public companies23
Earlier study, conducted in 2004, showed that women occupy only 14.6% of 
the seats in supervisory boards and 16.1% of the positions in management 
boards in Croatian public companies.24
22  Means are calculated on the sample of 31 companies operating under two-tier system, 
since the only company operating under one-tier system has all male members.
23  Survey results. See complete report Tipurić, D. et al. (2015) Korporativno upravljanje u 
Hrvatskoj: Ocjena kvalitete korporativnog upravljanja hrvatskih dioničkih društava SEEC-
GAN metodologijom, CIRU, Zagreb
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Still, in Croatia doesn’t exist strong social support nor legislative that would 
improve gender balance in supervisory and management boards. Final target 
of 40% representation of the under-represented sex would be extremely diffi -
cult to reach in these circumstances.
In vast majority of Croatian public companies the awareness of gender equal-
ity issues doesn’t exist. Problems of gender (in)equality obviously aren’t pri-
ority in strategic management of managerial resources in Croatian companies 
despite numerous fi ndings of gender and other forms of diversity positive ef-
fects on fi nancial performance, organizational climate, innovativeness, orga-
nizational creativity, superior confl ict management techniques and so forth.  
4. CONCLUSION
Providing opportunities for women to participate in the decision-making pro-
cesses in corporate governing bodies is conditio sine qua non of more in-
clusive and democratic corporate society.  These opportunities are now days 
delivered through different measures that include proposals in national codes, 
voluntary initiatives, demands for disclosure of nomination policies and quotas 
for female members on boards. 
While in the United States, debate on quota introduction is moving toward 
“comply-or-explain” solution (since quotas are undermining basic propositions 
of fair and equal opportunities according to proponents of the opposed view), 
in Europe, quotas are seen as legitimate means to improve women representa-
tion on company boards. Since introduced in Norway, in 2005, representation 
of female members on boards increased tremendously and today is stable at 
around one third. At the European Union level, efforts are visible. European 
Commission appealed to all listed companies having less than 40% of the 
under-represented sex non-executive directors to assure representation of at 
least 40% aiming at gender equality. By 2020, gender balance (50% represen-
tation of both sexes) should be reached by active implementation of selection 
and appointment procedures for non-executive directors (one-tier system) and 
supervisory boards (two-tier system).
Recent data provided by the European Commission show that women account 
for an average of 18.6% of the members of boards in EU 28 member states. 
The smallest proportion of women on boards is in the Mediterranean countries 
such as Malta, Portugal and Spain and that proportion is enlarging as we geo-
graphically move toward northern European countries. 
We provide relevant data for Croatia and show that in 10 years period (com-
paring results for 2004 and 2014) no signifi cant progress was made regarding 
11
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women representation on management and supervisory boards. Croatian pub-
lic companies have to put stronger emphasis on gender equality issues not just 
for the cause of creating more fair and responsible society but for the cause 
of stimulating superior fi nancial performance of Croatian companies through 
gender diversity.
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